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1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are a group of distinguished law professors
who have worked on evidence and criminal law issues
for many years. Amici were involved in the drafting
process for Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) and have likewise
researched and written on issues of juror bias, jury
service, and voir dire. They have an academic interest
in the issues presented and the correct resolution of
this case.
The brief is joined by the following professors:

Susan Crump, Professor of Law, South Texas
College of Law.
Bennett Gershman, Professor of Law, Pace Law
School.
Victor Gold, Dean and Professor of Law, Loyola
Law School, Los Angeles.
Paul Rothstein, Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center.
Ben Trachtenberg, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Missouri School of Law.
1

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici affirm that no counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person other
than amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution to its
preparation or submission. Petitioner’s blanket letter of consent
to the filing of amicus briefs has been filed with the Clerk’s office.
Respondent’s consent to the filing of this brief is being filed with
the Clerk’s office together with the brief.

2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner asks this Court to interpret Fed. R.
Evid. 606(b) as permitting statements made by jurors
during deliberations to be admitted to support a motion
for a new trial. The practical conse.~uences of
petitioner’s rule would be significant and problematic,
not only fundamentally altering the purpose and
practice of voir dire, but also providing a new, factdriven, basis for post-trial motions. These expanded
proceedings would place substantial additio~aal burdens
of courts, lawyers and jurors alike. In light of existing
mechanisms to ensure juror honesty and impartiality,
petitioner’s rule would disrupt a well-.functioning
system for little to no benefit.
1. Petitioner incorrectly argues that his rule would
further the purposes of voir dire. Quite to the contrary,
his rule would transform voir dire from an opportunity
to discover juror bias into a strategic mechanism for
setting up post-trial challenges based on juror
dishonesty. Lawyers would be incentivized to ask
broad and vague questions at voir dire - much like the
questions at issue in this case - which maximize the
likelihood that personal experiences or opinions shared
during deliberations could later be characterized as
inconsistent with the juror’s response at voir dire. This
would be the case notwithstanding that these sorts of
questions are the least effective at uncovering juror
bias. Furthermore, the possibility that voir dire
questions would later form the basis for admitting
statements made during deliberation would
undoubtedly make voir dire a more contentious stage of
the trial. This would both increase the number of
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motions and appeals related to voir dire, and also make
the already lengthy process of empanelling a jury even
more time-consuming.
2. Petitioner’s rule would also have the effect of
introducing post-verdict, fact-bound allegations of juror
dishonesty during voir dire into virtually every jury
trial. Lawyers are under ethical obligations to
diligently represent their clients, and once a jury trial
has been lost, the opportunity to seek a new trial based
on an allegedly dishonest statement will obligate
lawyers to seek any and all information available to
them about what was said during deliberations.
Indeed, a failure to adequately pursue these claims
could leave lawyers subject to disciplinary proceedings
or charges of malpractice. Petitioner’s capacious
definition of "dishonesty" would only compound this
problem, in that a juror’s inevitable reliance on his own
life experience during deliberations (which historically
has been perceived as a benefit of the jury system)
could be used as proof that the juror is irrevocably
biased.
Moreover, the potential for myriad
interpretations (or misinterpretations) of what is said
during deliberations would provide a fertile ground for
new trial motions, greatly reducing the finality that a
jury verdict is meant to provide.
3. Finally, Petitioner’s rule would further erode
public participation in the jury system while providing
little additional assurance of jury impartiality. Evasion
of jury service, whether through reliance on statutory
excuses or failure to respond to summonses, is already
a widespread problem. This problem produces sparse
jury venires, thereby undermining efforts to ensure an
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aspect of jury impartiality that Petitioner entirely
ignores: the impartiality secured by juror selection
from a broad, representative cross-section of the
community. By extending jurors’ involvement in a case
beyond the delivery of a verdict, and by motivating
attorneys to pry into jurors’ personal understandings
and experiences as discussed during deliberations,
Petitioner’s rule would enlarge existing deterrents to
participation in the jury system, and for little to no
benefit. Adequate deterrents and remedies to juror
dishonesty during voir dire already exist, as such
dishonesty may still provide grounds for a new trial
(only supported by
evidence not concerning
deliberations), and may subject jurors to criminal
sanctions. Accordingly, there is no cause for the
adoption of Petitioner’s burdensome rule.
ARGUMENT
I.

Petitioner’s Rule Would Transform Voir Dire
From An Opportunity To Discover Juror Bias
Into A Strategic Mechanism For Setting Up
Post-Trial Motions Based Ola Juror
Dishonesty.

Petitioner asks this Court to adopt a rule "Lhat would
allow parties to pursue a post-trial motion for a new
trial based on statements made during deliberations.
The thrust of Petitioner’s argument is that s~uch a rule
is necessary to carry out the purpose of voir dire, which
"safeguards the constitutional right to trial by impartial
jury." Pet’r Br. at 38. Far from being an essential
component of that safeguard, however, Petitioner’s rule
would greatly undermine the legitimacy and the
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efficacy of the voir dire process. It would also make
voir dear a more contentious and laborious process.
A. Petitioner’s Rule Would Incentivize Lawyers
To Ask Broad Questions To Set Up Future
Claims Of Juror Dishonesty, Even Though
Such Questions Are The Least Effective At
Uncovering Juror Bias.
This Court has consistently recognized that voir
dire is intended to serve two purposes. First, it
provides counsel and the court with a means of
discovering actual or implied bias, such that jurors can
be removed for cause. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1994); Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500
U.S. 415, 431 (1991). A juror is biased and thus
removable for cause if his "views ’would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’"
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433 (1985)) (quoting
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). Second, voir
dire provides counsel with the information necessary to
exercise peremptory challenges. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at
143; Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 431. While Petitioner argues
that permitting post-trial juror dishonesty claims based
on statements made during deliberation would further
the discovery of bias, in actual fact, it would shift the
sorts of questions asked in voir dire towards those that
are least effective in uncovering juror bias.
Under Petitioner’s rule, lawyers will recognize that
asking broad and vague questions at voir dire presents
a significant opportunity to game the trial process. As
the Tenth Circuit observed in rejecting the rule
Petitioner advances, "[a] broad question during voir
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dire could then justify the admission of any number of
jury statements that would now be re-characterized as
challenges to voir dire rather than challenges to the
verdict." United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1236
(10th Cir. 2008). Lawyers would thus have the
incentive to preload voir dire with broad questions,
which maximize the likelihood that personal experience
or opinion shared during deliberations could be
characterized as inconsistent with the juror’s response
at voir dire. The broad questions Petitioner relies on in
this case - "Is there anyone who feels they would not
be a proper juror to hear this case?", "Is there any
reason why you cannot remain fair and impartial?" and
"Is there anyone who would not be able to render a
verdict based solely on the law?" - provide excellent
examples of the utility that broad questions would
have. One could characterize virtually any statement of
personal experience or opinion as being inconsistent
with a lack of response to these questions. Any juror
who, during deliberation, begins a senter~ce with "I
knew a person who...", "From my personal experience
...", or "I refuse to believe ..." would provide fodder
for a lawyer’s post-trial motion that the juror
misrepresented his impartiality.
Broad questions of this nature do little to further
the purpose of voir dire. It is well established that such
questions are the least effective at uncovering juror
bias because they rarely elicit a meaningful response.
See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 3,10, 375 (7th
Cir. 1972) (holding that a "broad" and "general" voir
dire question about exposure to pretrial publicity was
"not adequate to bring out responses" fro~ jurors and
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"should not be relied on"); United States v. Lewin, 467
F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir. 1972) ("[A] general question is
inadequate to call to the attention of the veniremen
those important matters that might lead them to
recognize or to display their disqualifying attributes.");
Kuzniak v. Taylor Supply Co., 471 F.2d 702, 703 (6th
Cir. 1972) (holding that "general questioning of the
jurors as to whether they knew of any reason why they
could not give the plaintiffs a fair trial" did not present
sufficient opportunity for plaintiffs to uncover juror
bias); see also Karen R. Roberts, Voir Dire: How to Ask
Questions that Matter and Get Answers that Count,
Winter 2006 ATLA-CLE-199 (suggesting that broad
questions are less likely than case-specific questions to
uncover juror bias). Under Petitioner’s rule, however,
a juror’s lack of appreciation for the question at the
time of voir dire actually plays into the lawyer’s hands.
The lawyer seeks not to elicit a meaningful response at
voir dire, but to have the prospective juror provide an
incomplete response, which can later be used to
challenge the juror’s honesty.
That lawyers will be in a position to get the better
of jurors at voir dire and subsequently engineer
disputes as to their honesty should go without saying.
As this Court has cautioned:
It is well to remember that the lay persons on
the panel may never have been subjected to the
type of leading questions and crossexamination tactics that frequently are
employed, and that were evident in this case.
Prospective jurors represent a cross section of
the community, and their education and
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experience vary widely. Al~,~o, unlike
witnesses, prospective jurors have had no
briefing by lawyers prior to taking the stand.
Jurors thus cannot be expected invariably to
express themselves carefully or even
consistently.
Patto~ v. You~t, 467 U.S. 1025, 10.~9 (1984).
Furthermore, as Professor Babcock obser’~ed in her
leading article on the significance of voir dire, lawyers
are already well versed in taking advantage of jurors’
inclinations at voir dire:
Experienced litigators know, and empirical
studies have substantiated, that it is part of the
psychology of the venire for some people to
decide that they want to be on the jury. To
that end, such people will evade or
misconstrue, unconsciously or deliberately,
general voir dire questions in order to avoid
answering and possibly being struck..
Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its
Wonderful Power", 27 Stan. L. Rev. 545, 547 (1975)
(footnote omitted); see also Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire
Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. C. L. R. 503,
510-11 (1965) (describing several examples in which
jurors do not respond to voir dire questions because,
for instance, they are "too nervous"). Lawyers will no
doubt be able to shape broad questions that elicit an
incomplete response at voir dire, but. lay the
groundwork for a post-trial challenge based on
dishonesty.
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This risk is particularly acute in federal courts,
where parties submit voir dire questions to a judge,
who then conducts most of the inquiry. See Nancy
Gertner & Judith H. Mizner, The Law of Juries § 3:21,
at 101 (7th ed. 2013); Gregory E. Mize, Paula
Hannaford-Agor & Nicole L. Waters, Nat’l Center for
St. Cts., The State-of-the-States Survey of Jury
Improvement Efforts: A Compendium Report, 27-28
(Apr. 2007). Empirical research demonstrates that
jurors are even more likely to give incomplete answers
when questioned by a judge than by a lawyer, due, at
least in part, to intimidation as a result of the judge’s
position as an authority figure. See Susan E. Jones,
Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire, 11 Law
& Hum. Behav. 131 (1987); Gertner & Mizner, supra, at
102 ("[L]awyer voir dire promotes more candid
exchanges than does judge voir dire."). Judges
themselves are in a poor position to distinguish
between those questions that are a legitimate attempt
to uncover bias and those that a lawyer has designed to
set up a post-trial challenge both because judges
typically "know little about a case" at the time of voir
dire and because judges, as a general matter, are not
experts in distinguishing between questions that will
lead to "distorted" answers and those that will not.
Gertner & Mizner, supra, §§ 3:19, 3:21, at 97, 102.
B. Petitioner’s Rule Would Make Voir Dire A
More Contentious And Lengthy Process.
Because lawyers for both parties will recognize the
opportunity to set up post-trial challenges, Petitioner’s
rule would also make voir dire itself a more contentious
exercise. Faced with the risk of having responses at
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voir dire used as the premise for undoing an entire
trial, parties will no doubt strenuously contest the
questions advanced by their opponents. Again, trial
judges will generally be ill-equipped to resolve such
disputes given the "limited information" that they have
at the time of voir dire. Gertner & Mizner, supra,
§ 3:21, at 102. The trial judge’s decision to reject
certain questions, however, will no doubt become the
subject of post-trial motions and appeals, on the basis
that the rejected question would have provided a basis
for challenging the juror for dishonesty given
statements made during deliberation. No:~e of these
disputes, of course, would have anything to do with
actually uncovering juror bias. Indeed, they would only
distract from that pursuit.
And that distraction would come with a cost. The
efforts of lawyers to elicit as many responses (or
nonresponses) as possible that could later be used to
challenge a juror’s honesty, combined with the disputes
that arise therefrom, would lengthen a voir dire process
that, in most courts, is already long enough. This Court
has previously recognized the importance of limiting
voir dire to a reasonable length of time, cautioning that
an excessively long voir dire "in and of itself
undermines public confidence in the courts and the
legal profession." Press-Enter. Co. v. Super Ct. of Cal.,
464 U.S. 501, 510 n.9 (1984). Even without the added
disturbance that would follow from Petitioner’s rule,
voir dire in both civil and criminal cases can last weeks
or months. See Margaret B. Kovera, Jason J. Dickinson
& Brian L. Cutler, Voir Dire and Jury Selection, in
Handbook of Psychology, Forensic Psychology 161
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(2003); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme
Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153,
157 n.13 (1989) (referring to a study finding that in
twenty percent of New York cases, voir dire took
longer than the trial itself); Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S.
at 510 n.9 (acknowledging counsel’s statement that "it
is not unknown in California courts for jury selection to
extend six months"). The Court should not accept
Petitioner’s rule, which, in addition to being
counterproductive to the goals of voir dire, would make
the lengthy process of empanelling a jury even longer.
II.

Petitioner’s Rule Would Result In PostVerdict Juror Dishonesty Challenges In
Virtually Every Case, Leading To
Interminable Inquiries Into Juror’s Mental
States And Disrupting The Finality Of Jury
Verdicts.

Petitioner, evidently aware of the dramatic
consequences that his rule could have on the thousands
of jury trials that take place each year in federal
courts,2 claims his rule would neither lead to jurors
being "harassed and beset by the defeated party" post
trial, Pet’r Br. 42 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S.
264, 267 (1915)), nor detract from the finality of jury
2

During the year ending on September 30, 2013, there were 4,517
jury trials in the United States District Courts. United States
Courts, Judicial Business 2013, at Table T-l, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/
2013/appendices/T01Sep13.pdf.
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verdicts, see Pet’r Br. 44. Despite Petitioner’s claims to
the contrary, the two practical problems he highlights
are necessary consequences of the rule he propounds.
Lawyers’ dutie~ to their clients would require that they
vigorously pursue the possibility of post-trial juror
dishonesty claims in every case, and in so doing lawyers
would engage in the wide-ranging investigation into
jury room proceedings that Rule 606(b) is designed to
prevent. Moreover, the availability of thi~,~ new, factdriven, attack on a verdict would open up an entirely
new avenue for post-trial proceedings, diluting the
finality that jury verdicts are intended to provide.
A. Lawyers Are Under An Ethical Obligation To
Represent Their Clients Vigorously And
Would Thus Be Required To Pursue Juror
Dishonesty Claims After Any Unfavorable
Verdict.
Under ABA Model Rules of Profl Conduct R 1.3, a
lawyer is required to act with "reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client." As explained in
greater detail in the comments to the model rule,
reasonable diligence requires a lawyer to "take
whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to
vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must
also act with commitment and dedicatilon to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client’s behalf." ABA Model Rules of Profl
Conduct R. 1.3 cmt. 1; see also Pa. Profl Conduct R. 1.3
cmt. 1 ("A lawyer should ... take whatever’ lawful and
ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s
cause or endeavor."); Tex. Disciplinary Rules Profl

13
Conduct R. 1.01 cmt. 6 ("[A] lawyer should act ... with
zeal in advocacy on the client’s behalf.").
This Court has likewise long recognized that
fundamental to the role of an attorney is ’"fearless,
vigorous and effective’ advocacy, no matter how
unpopular the cause in which it is employed." Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954) (quoting Sachet v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1952)).
Naturally, the vigorous representation of a client
has its limits, and lawyers are not permitted to pursue
knowingly frivolous or vexatious motions or appeals.
See, e.g., Fed R. Civ. P. 11(b); Polk Cnty v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 323 (1981) ("[T]he canons of professional
ethics impose limits on permissible advocacy. It is the
obligation of any lawyer - whether privately retained
or publicly appointed - not to clog the courts with
frivolous motions or appeals."). Nevertheless, so long
as a viable avenue for overturning an unfavorable
verdict exists, lawyers are bound to vigorously pursue
that avenue to the best of their abilities.
Indeed, a failure to vigorously advocate on the part
of a client does not merely violate a lawyer’s ethical
obligations, but leaves him open to a variety of adverse
consequences as well. For example, a failure to raise
potentially viable post-trial motions can result in an
adverse proceedings before bar disciplinary committees
and sanctions ranging from censure to disbarment. See
In re Parker, No. 14-032-096998, Subcommittee
Determination (Va. St. Bar 3d Dist. Subcomm. Mar. 27,
2014), available at http://www.vsb.org/docs/Parker051614.pdf (publicly admonishing attorney for, inter
alia, failing to file post-trial motion to modify client’s
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sentence, which he had been retained to author and
submit); In re Yunker, 25 DB Rptr. 50, 52 (Or. Discipl.
Bd. 2011), available at http://www.osbar.org/_docs/
dbreport/dbr25.pdf (publicly reprimanding an attorney
for, inter alia, failing to file a motion to set aside the
administrative dismissal of a case in which he was
attempting to collect an arbitration award). Likewise,
the failure to raise a meritorious post-trial motion has
been deemed to be professional malpractice in some
instances, leaving a lawyer open not only to the
opprobrium of a malpractice finding, but also to the
financial consequences of a damages judgment. See
Davis v. Brown, 23 F. App’x 504, 506 (6th Cir. 2001)
(upholding $10,000 punitive damages award against
attorney who committed legal malpractice by failing to
file a motion requested by his client); see also Logan v.
Winstead, 23 S.W.3d 297, 299 n.4 (Tenn. 2000) (noting
that failure to file proper motions, such as a motion to
suppress evidence or a motion to confront a confidential
informant, constitutes legal malpractice).
In light of these requirements of diligenl~ advocacy,
were FRE 606(b) read to allow the use of statements
made in the jury room as the basis for a new trial
motion, every time a lawyer lost a jury trial he would
be required to go to any permissible lengths to discover
what was said by jurors during deliberations.
Petitioner argues that "mere admission of evidence
that tends to show juror dishonesty during voir dire
would not automatically entitle a party to a new trial
under McDonough." Pet’r Br. 44. But whether or not
Petitioner’s rule would actually undermine numerous
jury verdicts - and in light of his capacious definition of
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"dishonesty" there is reason to believe it would, see
infra 17-22 - Petitioner’s argument is a tacit
acknowledgement that the consequences of a ruling in
his favor would be to make a post-trial inquiry into
juror dishonesty, and likely an ensuing motion, a
feature of every jury trial. The consequences of this
new raft of motions for the conservation of scarce
judicial resources would necessarily be severe. See
Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and
the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad
Exclusionary Principal of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66
N.C.L. Rev. 509, 533 (1988) ("An adverse jury verdict
is a painful event, combining personal rejection and
professional failure with injury to the client who relied
on the lawyer. The losing trial lawyer, therefore, may
have an unusually strong inclination to search
vigorously for misconduct, attribute the loss to it, and
construct arguments maximizing the effect of marginal
violations, even as she searches her own mind for the
cause of the verdict. For these reasons, open reception
of evidence of jury misconduct would consume judicial
resources inefficiently.").
Moreover, it is a red herring for Petitioner to point
to the well-established ethical rules that "generally
prohibit counsel from engaging in any form of juror
harassment." Pet’r Br. 43 (citing, e.g., Model Rules of
Profl Conduct R. 3.5(c)). For one, the definition of
what constitutes juror "harassment" is hardly uniform,
and especially if lawyers become ethically bound to
pursue potential juror dishonesty post-trial motions,
what once might have been considered harassing could
be deemed within the bounds of diligent
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representation. See, e.g., Comm’n for Lawyer
Discipline v. Benson, 980 S.W.2d 425, 439 (Tex. 1998)
(noting that courts have disagreed on "wlhether the
term ’harass’ standing alone is clear enough to survive
a vagueness review," and citing cases). Moreover,
while it is true that lawyers are generally prohibited
from contacting jurors who have made knov~n a desire
not to be contacted, see ABA Model Rules Profl
Conduct R. 3.5(c), Petitioner entirely ignores the fact
that a juror accused of dishonesty by a fellow juror analogous to what happened in this very case - could
nevertheless be forced into post-trial proceedings and
potentially required to testify in col~rt about
statements she made during deliberations. So long as a
single member of the jury has doubts about something
that was said and reaches out to the losing counsel, the
carefully calibrated rules that ensure jurors’
involvement with a case ends once the verdict is read
could be rendered largely meaningless. Finally, the
mere presence of a rule prohibiting law~yers from
harassing jurors of course does not prevent such
harassment from already occurring, even without the
added incentive of the potential reversal of an adverse
verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Brasco, 516 F.2d 816,
819 n.4 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing as "reprehensible" the
"complicity by counsel in a planned, systematic, broadscale post~trial inquisition of the jurors by a private
investigator"); United States v. Miller, 28,1 F. Supp.
220, 228 (D. Conn. 1968) (issuing an injunction
preventing defense counsel from having furti~er contact
with jurors post-trial and noting that "[1]ea~ing jurors
at the mercy of investigators for both side.s to probe
into their conduct would make the already difficult task
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of obtaining competent citizens willing to serve as
jurors well nigh impossible").
B. Petitioner’s Capacious Definition Of Juror
Dishonesty Would Lead To Broad-Ranging
Inquiries Into Jury Room Deliberations.
The potential adverse consequences of Petitioner’s
rule are only heightened in light of the capacious
definition of juror "dishonesty" he advocates for in this
case. Pinpointing the actual "dishonest" statement
alleged in Petitioner’s brief is something of a challenge.
It appears, however, that Petitioner is relying on the
foreperson’s silence in response to the judge’s questions
about whether any prospective juror "would not be a
proper juror to sit in a case of this kind," and would not
be "able to render a verdict based solely and only on
the law." Pet’r Br. 6 (quotation marks omitted). The
argument appears to be that this was dishonest
because the foreperson was strongly influenced by
prior experiences of her daughter. Id. Although the
question presented in this case assumes the
foreperson’s silence was dishonest, it is hardly clear
that she was irrevocably conflicted and misrepresented
that fact during voir dire.
In this respect, Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1
(1933), is instructive. In Clark, this Court upheld a
finding of criminal contempt upon finding that a juror
had failed to disclose that she had worked for a
company owned by the defendant and that even after
her employment had concluded her husband maintained
close relations with the defendant. Id. at 7. Those
personal contacts led the juror to "place[] her hands
over her ears when other jurors tried to reason with
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her," and she discussed extraneous evidence with the
jury in an attempt to discredit the government and
create sympathy for the defendant. Id. at 8-(,t. Clark is
worlds apart from the conduct at issue in this case, and
courts have found no prejudice to a party even when a
juror has connections more significant than anything
even alleged against the foreperson here. See, e.g.,
People v. Myers, No. 291896, 2010 WL 3063687, at *4-5
(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2010) (offender not prejudiced
by having juror who recognized during trial that the
complaining witness was the vice-president of the union
to which the juror belonged); Polk v. State, No. M200202430-CCA-R3PC, 2003 WL 22243392, at *5 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2003) (holding, on post--conviction
review, that no evidence existed to show that offender
was prejudiced by having juror who worked with the
prosecutor’s wife).
Indeed, Petitioner’s rule could be particularly
pernicious because it transforms a juror’s life
experiences and understanding of the community - long
understood to be the benefit of adjudication l:,y a jury of
the parties’ peers - into a unrebuttable presl~mption of
bias and prejudice in favor of one side. See Laura I.
Appleman, The Community Right to Counsel, 17
Berkeley J. Crim. L. 1, 34 (2012) ("Both in England and
in the colonies, the community was represented by the
jury, that bulwark of societal conscience, perfectly
suited, in Hale’s opinion, ’for the preservation of
liberty, life, and property.’" (quoting Matthew Hale,
The History of the Common Law of England, and an
Analysis of the Civil Part of the Law 346 (6th ed.,
1820)). Ridding a juror of her prior experiences is as
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impossible as it is undesirable. See Standard Oil Co. v.
Van Etten, 107 U.S. 325, 334 (1882) ("The very spirit of
trial by jury is that the experience, practical knowledge
of affairs, and common sense of jurors, may be appealed
to, to mediate the inconsistencies of the evidence, and
reconcile the extravagances of opposing theories of the
parties.").
Rule 606(b) was designed to prevent precisely this
type of post-hoc dissection of juror motivations and
internal mental processes. Not only does the text of
the rule prevent any post-trial testimony (for the
purposes of attacking a verdict) on "any juror’s mental
processes concerning the verdict," but the legislative
history recognizes that a rule to the contrary would
leave jurors’ motivations constantly subject to question
in an attempt to undermine validly-reached verdicts.
See, e.g., Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 225 (1974)
(statement of Paul F. Rothstein, Professor of Law,
Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.) (noting that House
version of FRE 606(b), which would have permitted
testimony concerning jury deliberations "is antithetical
to the smooth functioning of the jury system and
conflicts with the traditional policy justifications for
juror incompetency - the encouragement of full and
frank jury deliberations and the avoidance of juror
harassment, annoyance, and reprisals"); S. Rep. No.
93-1277, at 14 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7061 ("Public policy requires a finality to
litigation. And common fairness requires that absolute
privacy be preserved for jurors to engage in the full
and free debate necessary to the attainment of just
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verdicts. Jurors will not be able to functiorL effectively
if their deliberations are to be scrutinized !in post-trial
litigation. In the interest of protecting the jury system
and the citizens who make it work, rule 606 should not
permit any inquiry into the internal deliberations of the
jurors."); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1597, at 8 (1974) (Conf.
Rep.) (adopting Senate amendments and rejecting the
House version of the FRE, which would have allowed
"a juror to testify about objective matters occurring
during the jury’s deliberation").
Even laying aside the theoretical problems with
Petitioner’s rule, his wide-ranging concept:ion of what
constitutes juror dishonesty would also lead to
intractable administrative problems. To be clear, and
contrary to virtually the entirety of the brief filed by
amicus curiae National Association of Crimi:aal Defense
Lawyers, this case does not concern juror biases
related to characteristics such as race, gender, or
religion. While it may well be appropriate for this
Court to recognize, in a different case, that the
presence of such biases violates a party’s constitutional
rights, this case involves the entirely distirLct question
whether a prior life experience such as a family
member’s involvement with a car acciden~ renders a
juror unfit to serve.~ If the foreperson’s prior
3

The First Circuit has recognized that FRE 606(b) cannot be
constitutionally applied when issues of racial or etlhnic bias cast
into doubt the impartiality of a jury. See United States v. Villar,
586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) ("While the issue i,,~ difficult and
close, we believe that the rule against juror impeachment cannot
be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony in those rare and
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experiences rendered her silence during voir dire
dishonest, it is hard to see what types of experiences
would not necessitate disqualification. For example,
would a juror in a contract case be lying if he claimed
impartiality during voir dire yet at some point in the
past had been accused by a business partner of breach
of contract? Or, does a previous negative experience
with a police officer render a juror permanently unfit to
serve on a jury in a criminal trial? Indeed, even juror
forgetfulness could lead to a juror honesty challenge.
For example, what if a juror forgot about a bad
experience with a car dealership during voir dire, but
later recalled such an experience and recounted it
during deliberations? Or, what if a juror stated that
she has never lived in a "gang neighborhood" during
voir dire, yet later makes a statement during
deliberations that other jurors interpret as evidence
that the juror had in fact lived in such a neighborhood?
The possible bases for juror dishonesty challenges are
endless.
Given that every adult has already amassed a
wealth of life experiences both positive and negative,
grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during jury
deliberations implicate a defendant’s right to due process and an
impartial jury."); see also 27 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James
Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6074, at 513 (2d ed. 2007)
("[A]mong the most serious cases of jury bias are those involving
racial prejudice... This suggests that the constitutional interests
of the affected party are at their strongest when a jury employs
racial bias in reaching its verdict .... This also suggests that the
policy interests behind the enforcement of Rule 606(b) are at their
weakest in such a case.").
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Petitioner’s rule not only would vastly expand the
scope of voir dire questioning, see supra 4-11, but also
would encourage losing counsel to develop creative
theories impugning the neutrality of jurors. At that
point, jurors already discharged from service might
well be required to return to court and testify as to
their motivations and reasons for rendering the verdict
they did. Judges, in turn, would be faced with the
nearly impossible task of reviewing a juror’~ life history
and justifications for the verdict to determine whether
the juror was actually dishonest during voir dire¯ This
would in effect require a post-verdict mini-trial,
requiring adjudication of all the attendant questions of
admissibility and burden of proof¯
These concerns are not merely theoretical. Indeed,
a survey of juror dishonesty claims brought in courts in
the Ninth Circuit - which has adopted the rule
Petitioner proposes - demonstrates the extent to which
the alleged bases for dishonesty stray far afield from
traditional notions of failing to disclose conflicts of
¯
4
interest. Emboldened by the Ninth Circuit’s standard,

4

When given a sign that a court is receptive to juror-dishonesty
claims, defense attorneys have made some truly frivolous
arguments. In one recent Pennsylvania case, a juror who worked
37.5 hours a week at an accounting firm stated that her "usual" job
was as an accountant. The defendant later clairaed that this
answer had been dishonest in light of the fact that tlhe same juror
had a second, part-time job as a realtor, where she assisted in a
home sale once every few months. The judge rejected this
argument, concluding that the juror’s self-identification as an
accountant "simply cannot be considered a dishonest answer."
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many defendants have argued that jurors acted
"dishonestly" merely by failing to affirmatively
volunteer probative information to defense counsel.
See, e.g., Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 949 (9th
Cir. 2004) (no juror dishonesty when juror failed to
disclose that she had lived in a gang neighborhood 25
years ago when asked whether she currently lived in a
gang neighborhood); Hard v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,
870 F.2d 1454, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989) (no jury dishonesty
when juror failed to disclose past employment when
asked about current employment).
C. Petitioner’s Rule Would Diminish The
Finality Of Jury Verdicts.
A jury’s verdict, this Court has observed
"represents the community’s collective judgment
regarding all the evidence and arguments presented to
it." Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 122 (2009).
The finality of verdicts is so central to the judicial
process that this Court has noted "[e]ven if the verdict
is ’based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation,’ its
finality is unassailable." Id. at 122-23 (quoting Fong
Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per
curiam)). This is not to say of course that meritorious
post-trial motions and appeals should not be pursued.
But in recognition of the reality that litigants are
entitled "to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there
are no perfect trials," Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223, 231-32 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted),
United States v. Holck, 398 F. Supp. 2d 338, 361 (E.D. Pa. 2005),
af~d sub nom. United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2007).
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courts entertaining post-trial motions do not sit as
"citadels of technicality" rooting out any possible error,
regardless of how minor, as a basis upon which to
reverse a jury verdict, Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 759 (1946) (quotation marks omitted). See
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 319
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that while it is
"always possible to imagine more evidence which could
have been offered ... at some point litigation must
come to an end."). Respect for the finality of jury
verdicts not only is a question of judicial principles, but
also reflects a recognition of the cost - both financial
and emotional - to parties when proceedings run on ad
infinitum. See Peveto v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 807
F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Of course, in the jury
trial process there is always some danger that jurors
will misunderstand the law or consider improper
factors in reaching their verdict, but, by implementing
Rule 606(b), Congress has made the policy decision that
the social costs of such error are outweighed by the
need for finality to litigation, to protect jurors from
harassment after a verdict is rendered, and to prevent
the possible exploitation of disgruntled ex-jurors.").
Permitting post-trial investigation of juror’s mental
processes to form the basis for a new trial motion would
open up an entirely new factual avenue for lawyers to
pursue, and would necessitate substantial in,¢estigation,
discovery, and potentially even in-court testimony. In
this respect, a juror dishonesty post-trial challenge is
different in kind from the majority of post-trial motions
and appeals, which are limited to the record, created at
trial and focus on events that were raised al~d litigated
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during trial. By definition, a juror dishonesty challenge
requires the discovery and introduction of new
evidence - the juror’s statements and motivations
during deliberation - which will lead to costly
investigations and repeated attempts to seek new
information from both the challenged juror and other
members of the jury. This process will be timeconsuming and expensive and, given Petitioner’s
capacious definition of dishonesty, all of these efforts
would be expended merely to reveal that a juror was
informed by her prior life experiences in rendering a
verdict, something that should be encouraged not
prohibited.
Petitioner claims there is no cause for concern as
regards the finality of the judicial process because "a
McDonough motion would still be denied if a court
determines that the juror’s response to a voir dire
question was not dishonest at the time it was made," or
"that an honest answer to a material question would
not have provided a valid basis for a challenge for
cause." Pet’r Br. 45. In light of these substantive
hurdles, Petitioner assures this Court that
"McDonough’s requirements have proven to be
stringent in application." Id.
Petitioner’s assurances are unavailing. If in
practice McDonough challenges will frequently if not
always be rejected in light of the tough substantive
standards Petitioner allegedly proposes, then it is even
more dubious that a costly and extensive new post-trial
process is necessary or appropriate. While of course
verdicts should not be rendered by jurors who should
have been removed with valid strikes for cause, if
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Petitioner is correct and these challenges are rarely
successful, it suggests that the problem Petitioner
claims is illusory or at least far less pervasilve than he
suggests. If this Court were to accept Petitioner’s
definition of juror dishonesty it is possible that claims
of dishonesty would fare better going forward than
they have to date. But, as suggested above, this would
not be because more unfit jurors were properly being
removed from panels, but rather because perfectly
valid jurors whose verdicts were informed by their life
experiences were improperly being denied an
opportunity to serve.
III.

Petitioner’s Rule Would Impose Additional
Burdens On Jurors, Further Eroding Public
Participation In The Jury System While
Providing Minimal Additional Assurance Of
Jury Impartiality.

A wide majority of Americans consider the right of
trial by jury integral to the legitimacy c.f the U.S.
judicial system. See Am. Bar Ass’n, "... And Justice
for All": Ensuring Public Trust and Confidence in the
Justice System 6 (2001). Yet the burdens of jury
service - from the commitment of time and often
attendant loss of wages to the privacy intrusions
incident to the selection process - frequently prove
more than citizens are willing to bear when summoned.
Consequently, whether relying on statutory excuses or
simply failing to respond to summonses, citizens evade
jury service at considerable rates. By imposing
additional burdens on jurors, Petitioner’s rule would
only exacerbate the widespread problem of jury
evasion, to the detriment of courts and litiga~.~ts alike.
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A. The Burdens Of Jury Service Undermine
Public Participation In The Jury System.
Evasion of jury service has long plagued the
administration of justice in the United States. Citizens’
failure to respond to summons and failure to appear at
court "are a chronic problem in jury operations,"
occurring at an average national rate of eight percent.
Paula Hannaford-Agor, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, An
Overview of Contemporary Jury System Management
7 (May 2011), available at http://www.ncscjurystudies.org/-/media/Microsites/
Files/CJS/What%20We%20Do/Contemporaryjurysyste
mmanagement.ashx. An equally high percentage of
those who do respond to jury summons then request to
be excused on grounds of medical or financial hardship
or extreme inconvenience. Id.5
These problems are even more pronounced in
particular jurisdictions. Recent statistics from San
Antonio, Texas reveal that over 35 percent of those
summoned for jury duty ignore their summons
altogether. See Jayme Fraser, Only A Third of Those
Summoned for Jury Duty Show Up, Hous. Chron., Dec.
4, 2013, http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/
politics/houston/article/Only-a-third-of-those5

Still others go to even greater lengths to avoid jury service. For
example, some citizens do not register to vote in an effort to avoid
placement on jury lists. See Stephen Knack, Deterring Voter
Registration Through Juror Selection Practices: Evidence from
Survey Data, 103 Pub. Choice 49, 59 (2000); John Paul Ryan, The
American Trial Jury: Current Issues and Controversies, 63 Soc.
Educ. 458 (1999).
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summoned-for-jury-duty-show-5036084.php. In Dallas
County and Harris County, Texas, "less than one-fifth
of the people summoned to jury service ever make it to
the courthouse." Robert C. Walters et al., Jury of Our
Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU
L. Rev. 319, 319 (2005). Only about 15 percent of
Connecticut citizens who received a jury summons in
2013 actually served on a jury. See Jury
Administration, Conn. Judicial Branch (last visited
Aug. 8, 2014), available at http://www.jud.ct.gov/
statistics/jury/Jury_13.pdf. And in California, where
Petitioner’s rule prevails, "[b]arely a quarter of those
summoned actually complete their service." Daniel
Klerman, Am. Tort Reform Ass’n, A Look at California
Juries 2 (Sept. 2002) (explaining study firLdings that
nearly a third of those summoned sought ,excusal for
hardship or failed to appear); see also Walters et al.,
supra at 328 ("[M]ost states wrestle with e,:lually high
no-show rates." (quoting Tom Munsterman, Director of
Jury Studies at the National Center for State Courts);
Robert Walters & Mark Curriden, A Jury of One’s
Peers? Investigating Underrepresentatio~,~ in Jury
Venires, 43 Judges J. Fall 2004 at 17 (reporting that
other jurisdictions, such as Washington, D.C., have
even lower participation rates).
The reasons for such low rates of jury participation
are readily apparent. Jury service imposes
considerable burdens on citizens. Foremost among
these burdens is the commitment of time associated
with jury service and, in many cases, the attendant loss
of income. Many employers do not pay employees for
work missed due to jury service, and juror
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compensation is meager. Federal courts - which are
among the most generous - pay jurors only $40 per day
of service, see 28 U.S.C. § 1871(b)(1); cf. Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 215(a) (providing juror compensation of $15 per
day after the first day), whereas an eight-hour workday
at the federal minimum wage amounts to $58, see 29
U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (stating current federal minimum
wage of $7.25 per hour). Thus, "financial hardship and
extreme inconvenience are often as much the result of
the burden imposed on prospective jurors from jury
service as the prevailing socioeconomic conditions in
the community." Hannaford-Agor, Overview of
Contemporary Jury System Management, supra, at 7;
see also John Schwartz, Call to Jury Duty Strikes Fear
of Financial Ruin, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2009, at A1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/02/
us/02jury.html (reporting on increasing number of
citizens seeking excuse from jury service during
economic recession).
Beyond financial hardship, citizens fear the invasion
of privacy that often accompanies their appearance for
jury service. For many jurors, "the price of such
service may include intrusive questioning, disclosure of
their answers to the news media, background
investigations by counsel, release of their name and
address to the defendant and the public, and repeated
attempts by the press to obtain post-trial interviews."
David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right To
Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and Policy
Options, 70 Temple L. Rev. 1, 2-3 (1997). The threat of
such loss of privacy acts as a powerful disincentive to
appear for jury service in the first place. See Lior
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Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era
of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1667, 1694 (2008) ("Jury duty is already viewed as
an unappetizing prospect for many Americans, and the
loss of privacy associated with comprehensive
government background checks [in the voir dire
context] could prompt stiff resistance and exacerbate
juror absenteeism."); Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice:
The Case for the Routine Use of Ano~.ymous Juries in
Criminal Trials, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 123, 126 (1996)
(discussing reports "that many people are reluctant to
serve as jurors even in misdemeanor cases and.., fear
being approached at home after their assigned case has
ended").
B. Petitioner’s Rule Would Impose Additional
Burdens On Jurors, Further Eroding Public
Participation In The Jury Sy~,~tem And
Thereby Subverting Jury Impartiality.
Petitioner’s rule would add significantly to the
burdens described above. By allowing the introduction
of testimony concerning juror deliberations to show
juror dishonesty during voir dire, Petitioner’s rule
would incorporate a post-trial inquiry into juror
dishonesty, and likely an ensuing motion, into nearly
every jury trial. See supra 14-15. Such post-trial
inquiries and motions would necessarily extend the
jurors’ involvement with a case, thereby increasing the
time commitment and financial hardships associated
with jury service in general. Moreover, these inquiries
would threaten an even deeper invasion of privacy than
that occasioned by the typical trial: Attorneys would
have an incentive, and likely even a duty, to mine jury
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deliberations for any indications of a juror’s life
experiences or personal understandings that might
conflict with his statements or omissions during voir
dire. As a result, Petitioner’s rule would augment two
of the greatest disincentives to citizens’ participation in
the jury system, leading only to increased rates of jury
evasion.
Perhaps Petitioner would justify the additional
costs of judicial administration resulting from increased
rates of jury evasion6 as necessary to secure the worthy
promise of jury impartiality. But while Petitioner and
his supporting amici insist that "interpreting Rule
606(b) to preclude juror testimony regarding
dishonesty during voir dire would conflict with the
fundamental constitutional right to an impartial jury,"
Professors Br. in Supp. of Pet. 29; see Pet’r Br. 18, 38;
NACDL Br. 6, they ignore entirely a competing aspect
of impartiality embedded in the same constitutional
right: the "diffused impartiality" of the jury achieved
through selection from a venire that is "broadly
representative of the community." Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (quoting Thiel v.
S. Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)); see James H. Druff, Systemic and
6 These costs may be considerable. See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor,
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Increasing the Jury Pool: Impact of
the Employer Tax Credit 1 n.5 (Aug. 2004) (explaining that "[t]he
greater the number of prospective jurors who are excused for
financial hardship," or who simply fail to appear, "the greater the
administrative cost of the jury system on a per juror basis"
(citation omitted)).
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Individual Partiality: The Cross-Section Requirement
and Jury Impartiality, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1555, 1558
(1988) ("The concept of impartiality ... has come to
designate both the detachment of the selection process
and the detachment of the individual jurors.").
Jury evasion undermines the efforts of courts to
assemble a broad, representative cross-section of the
community from which to empanel a jury.~ See
Walters & Curriden, supra, at 18 ("If a representative
cross-section means anything, we must have significant
public participation." (quoting Professor Thomas
Baker)); Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Nat’l Ctr. for State
Courts, Increasing the Jury Pool: Impact of the
Employer Tax Credit 1 (Aug. 2004) (explaining that
absence due to financial hardship "tends to skew the
resulting composition of the jury pool t~ the more
affluent segments of society, potentially violating fair
cross section requirements"). And there i[s evidence
suggesting that higher rates of jury evasion result in
disproportionately low representation of certain
demographic groups, including minorities and low7

Juror absenteeism and recourse to hardship excuses may not
support a fair cross-section challenge. See Gertner & Mizner,
supra, § 2:1, at 28 (explaining that the Sixth Amendment "creates
a negative right, i.e., freedom from systematic e):clusion"); cf.
Hannaford-Agor, An Overview of Contemporary Jury System
Management, supra, at 13 ("Nevertheless, the question of whether
the impact of socioeconomic factors on the demographic
composition of the jury pool could support a fair cross section claim
is still unsettled."). Regardless, the Court should l:,e hesitant to
adopt a rule that would subvert in practice the principle it
purportedly vindicates.
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income workers, on jury venires. See Walters et al.,
supra, at 330-31 (suggesting that widespread jury
evasion results in disproportionately low
representation of Hispanics, young adults, and lowincome workers on jury venires). Thus, by augmenting
existing disincentives to participation in the jury
system, Petitioner’s rule would subvert a competing
yet equally important component of the impartiality it
purportedly vindicates.
C. There Already Exist Adequate Disincentives
And Remedies To Juror Dishonesty During
Voir Dire.
In any event, Petitioner’s rule is not necessary to
ensure the impartiality of the individual jurors
ultimately selected to a panel. Misrepresentations by
jurors during voir dire may still provide grounds for a
new trial if substantiated by admissible evidence. Rule
606(b) cordons off only a small subset of the evidence an
attorney could present in support of a McDonough
challenge. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273,
306 (2d Cir. 2006) (cautioning "district courts that, if
any significant doubt as to a juror’s impartiality
remains in the wake of objective evidence of false voir
dire responses, an evidentiary hearing generally should
be held").8 And the threat of prosecution and possible
8

Statutory disqualifications that surface after jury selection can
form the basis for a motion for a new trial in other jurisdictions as
well. See, e.g., Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d 915, 916 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1999) (explaining that, "with respect to oral questions asked
during voir dire, ... error occurs where a prejudiced or biased
juror is selected without fault or lack of diligence on the part of
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imprisonment under Clark, where the Court held that
"that "[c]oncealment or misstatement by a juror upon a
voir dire examination is punishable as a contempt if its
tendency and design are to obstruct the processes of
justice," 289 U.S. at 10, is a direct, powerful, and
therefore adequate deterrent to juror dishonesty
during voir dire. See United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S.
681, 756 (1964) ("The sanction imposed for criminal
contempt has always been ... designed to deter future
defiances of the court’s authority and to vi.ndicate its
dignity"); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111 (1925)
(noting that punishment for criminal cc,ntempt is
intended, inter alia, to "deter other like derelictions").
Given these tested means of ensuring juror
impartiality, Petitioner’s rule would be of little
additional service to that end. Meanwhile, the
additional burdens it would impose on jurors would
further erode broad public participation in the jury
system and thereby subvert the "diffused impartiality"
of the jury. In the interests of the robust jury
impartiality guaranteed by the Constitutic,n and the
efficient administration of justice, therefore, the Court
should decline to adopt such a rule.

defense counsel," and that a new trial is warranted if such error
results in harm (quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, thejudgment of the
Eighth Circuit should be affirmed.
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